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In late 2010 and early 2011, the Chinese press carried a number ofanalyses on the “deterioration of China’s regional security environ-ment.” The expression counteracts the notion, disseminated mostly by
American analysts, of assertiveness in China’s foreign policy in the region.
In Beijing experts’ point of view, the list of negative developments is long,
so much so that Ma Xiaojun even perceives a “new Cold War situation” 
(新的冷戰格局, xin de lengzhan geju). In the South China Sea, parties con-
testing Chinese sovereignty over some islands have hardened their stance
by moving closer to the United States. In China’s maritime neighbourhood,
the United States has held the biggest joint naval exercises with Japan and
South Korea in the histories of the two respective alliances. In Japan, the
Democratic Party quickly shed its accommodating China policy once it
came to power. Chinese experts are in agreement that the main factor be-
hind this deterioration is the “American return to East Asia” (重返東亞,
chongfan dongya), symbolised by US participation in the East Asia Summit
in October 2010 in Hanoi for the first time ever.
Liu Jianfei attributes the rise in regional tensions to a readjustment of
the Obama administration’s China policy. In November 2009, during the
first US presidential trip to China, the Chinese side believed it had im-
pressed on the Americans the need to respect its concepts – “mutual
strategic confidence” and consideration for China’s core interests. But
Beijing quickly realised that Washington’s so-called new China policy
consisted of the same negative elements as during previous administra-
tions: containment, encirclement, and balancing (牽制，防範，平衡,
qianzhi, fangfan, pingheng), serving the strategy of safeguarding US su-
premacy in Asia and the world. In Liu’s view, the US executive branch is
under greater pressure now, as it has been weakened following the mid-
term Congressional elections and the global economic crisis. Conse-
quently, Washington is seen as having overstepped the habitual limits of
its hostile policies towards China by interfering in the South China Sea
and openly backing Japan on the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute. Gao Zugui’s
analysis differs in that he sees US reaction rather than hostile initiatives.
This reaction is part of “offensive  defence” (進攻性防禦, jingongxing
fangyu), a classic balancing response to rising Chinese regional influ-
ence.
From this, in Liu’s view, insufficient “strategic communication” (戰略溝通
不夠, zhanluë goutong bu gou) amplified the discord between the two major
powers by opening a space for perhaps exaggerated interpretations based on
suspicions. Liu acknowledges that the Chinese perception of increased US in-
terference in matters of Chinese security interests in East Asia had led Beijing
towards a thorough revamping of its Asia strategy. The priority henceforth
would be to “throw the Americans out of Asia” (將美國趕出東亞, jiang meiguo
ganchu dongya). At the same time, Chinese diplomacy has ceased playing a
responsible stakeholder (負責任的利益攸關方, fuzeren de liyi youguanfang)
role in major issues of global governance and regional security.
Nevertheless, Liu prefers to see the deterioration of China’s security envi-
ronment in relative terms. The focus is on problems in East Asia, because in
other sub-regions of Asia, China enjoys rather stable relations with its neigh-
bours. In reality, even in East Asian geopolitics, there has been a limited
weakening (局部, jubu), far from global (全面, quanmian), of China’s posi-
tions. As proof of this Liu cites the strengthening of the Sino-Russian part-
nership, a development overlooked by many observers, but which gave China
elbow room in its dealings with Japan. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s
September 2010 visit ended with the signing of several cooperation accords
and a joint communiqué marking the 65th anniversary of the end of World
War II. This text, with marked anti-fascist and anti-imperialist language,
forged a Sino-Russian geopolitical front against Japan. In fact, a little after his
China visit, Medvedev became the first Russian president to set foot on the
Kuril Islands – occupied by Russia and claimed by Japan – striking a heavy
blow (沉重的打擊, chenzhong de daji) at Japan’s far right and leading Beijing
to adopt a hard line on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.
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Further, in Liu’s view, the US return to Asia does not signal a break with
Washington’s China policy by any means, and American disquiet over
China’s rise might need to be seen in context. US security priorities lie else-
where, in Afghanistan and Iran, confronting Al-Qaeda and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. American geopolitical activism is focused on
the Middle East crisis, and Washington is not seeking to fashion a new se-
curity order in East Asia. In this sense, the grand US strategy consists of
preserving an upper hand in the international domain. Instead of counter-
ing the rising might of one country or another, it is more about refurbish-
ing American domination over international affairs.
After all, no East Asian country that is cosying up to the United States
has effected major changes to its China policy. The substantial cooperative
ties between China and South Korea have survived the considerable dete-
rioration to China’s image among South Koreans following the Cheonan in-
cident (in which 46 seamen died). Moves to set up an Asean+1 free trade
zone have not been stalled by Southeast Asian countries despite tensions
in the South China Sea. Even Japanese conservatives set store on mutually
beneficial cooperation with China. On the whole, the foreign policy of each
of China’s neighbours in East Asia remains independent, far from being
wholly subject to US interests. Rather, the countries seek to balance the
benefits they gain from the two superpowers active in the region.
In this scenario, Liu arrives at a positive conclusion. Until 2020, Chinese
foreign policy might continue riding on its “period of historic opportunity”
(戰略機遇期, zhanlue jiyuqi). Gao Zugui hardly differs, saying that it is
enough for China to make no changes to its dual policy strategy of good
neighbourliness and positive opening to Asian regionalism to continue
gaining strength in East Asia. In his view, the series of incidents in 2010 in
the Korean peninsula, around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and in the South
China Sea have rather underlined the shared responsibility of China and
the United States in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia.
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Violent incidents in Xinjiang appear to the Chinese to be proliferat-ing since 1990, especially after the media focus on the events ofJuly 2009 in Urumqi. Chinese analysts tend to highlight the events’
links to the internationalisation of pro-independence activism through the
“East Turkistan movement” (東突, Dongtu). This internationalisation theme
has a more general bearing on the issue of “three evil forces” (三股勢力) (6)
deemed to be growing in Xinjiang via transnational pro-East Turkistan or-
ganisations whose numbers have been expanding since the advent of eco-
nomic reforms in China. Xie Mengcen stresses the formation in the United
States in 2004 of two organisations that have emerged as beacons of the
political independence quest on the global scene: the “World Uyghur Con-
gress” (7) (世界維吾爾代表大會, shijie weiwu’er daibiao dahui) and the “East
Turkistan Government in Exile” (8) (東突厥斯坦流氓政府, dongtujuesitan li-
uwang zhengfu). Most articles on the internationalisation of the East Turk-
istan movement fail to mention Turkey, although a pan-Turkic ideological
basis (泛突厥主義, fan tujue zhuyi) is often attributed to these organisa-
tions. On the other hand, Sino-Turkish relations are constantly invoked in
discussions of Xinjiang. They stress Turkey’s position as one of the main
bases of the East-Turkistan movement. They particularly emphasise the
need for Ankara’s clear political support to China’s stand regarding Xin-
jiang. At the same time, they tend to show that it is through Sino-Turkish
collaboration on Xinjiang’s stability that Turkey could retain its influence
on Central Asia, where China’s importance is growing, especially after the
creation in 2001 of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), of
which Turkey is not a member.
Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations with Turkey in 1971,
China has been unable to improve its image among the Turks, as Zan Tao
observes. The Korean War, in which the Turkish army fought alongside the
Americans, left a negative impression of Chinese Communists in Turkey.
Also, Turkish nationalists have bristled at the support to Turkey’s extreme
leftists from the Chinese Communist Party in the 1960s. Bilateral relations
have developed mainly since the 1980s. It is only recently that Turkish
elites have taken note of China’s rising power, Zan notes. Then again, China
has yet to acquire the strategic importance that the United States, the
neighbouring European Union countries, Central Asia, or the Middle East
enjoy in Turkey’s eyes.
Meanwhile, Zan Tao as well as Zhu Xiang point out the eastward shift
(向 “東方,” xiang “dongfang”) in Turkish diplomatic focus since the end of
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